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Reed M. Wood, Arizona State UniversityPrevious studies suggest that women’s access to political power often increases following the termination of civil con-
flicts, particularly those ending in negotiated settlement. However, the effect of these changes has received limited atten-
tion. We argue that the proportion of female representatives in a national legislature prolongs peace following a negotiated
settlement.Moreover, we highlight twomechanisms throughwhich greater female representation reduces the risk of conflict
recurrence: (1) by prioritizing social welfare spending over military spending and (2) by improving public perceptions
of good governance and the credibility of political elites. We further argue that legislative independence and authority
conditions this relationship, implying that greater female representation is more likely to promote peace in states with
nominally democratic political institutions. Our empirical analyses of peace duration following negotiated settlements
between 1946 and 2011 provide robust support for our general argument and the underlying mechanisms we believe drive
this relationship.If women were fully engaged in all these aspects of peacebuilding, they would help prevent the impunity that undermines efforts to re-establish
the rule of law. . . . In governance, if women were engaged in policy decision making and employed in public administration, we would see more
diversity expressed in policy making and more attention to community and family needs.1
—Michelle Bachelet, Chilean president and former executive director of UN WomenGender inclusivity—particularly the incorporation ofwomen into both peace processes and post-conflictpolitical decision making—has been promoted by
the international community through measures such as UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and implemented
in various ways in many states at risk of, or emerging from,
instability and violence.2 Through suchmechanisms, theUnited
Nations and its member states have highlighted the dispro-
portionate impact of war on the lives of women and called
attention to the important roles women can play in conflict
resolution and the maintenance of peace. As the above state-
ment from Michelle Bachelet emphasizes, the rationale be-
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Previous studies demonstrate that women’s status in so-
ciety plays an important role in the production and resolu-
tion of political violence (e.g., Hudson et al. 2009) and that
women’s access to political power often increases follow-
ing the termination of violent civil conflict (e.g., Hughes and
Tripp 2015). Yet, few studies have directly examined the in-
fluence of increasing gender diversity within national political
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flicts—particularly those terminating in a negotiated settle-
ment—face a persistent risk of conflict relapse. Large-scale
internal conflict produces grievances, underdevelopment, and
mistrust among recent adversaries, which in turn raises the
risk of future episodes of violence (Collier et al. 2003; Walter
2014). Breaking this “conflict trap” necessitates interventions
that can effectively address the underlying conditions that
drive this cycle. As we argue below, increasing female repre-
sentation within national legislatures represents one poten-
tially fruitful intervention to increase peace durability.
In contrast to previous studies addressing related questions
(e.g., Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly 2015; Ruddick 1995), we
make no assumptions regarding women’s inherent pacifistic
attitudes per se. Similarly, while acknowledging the important
role that societal gender norms play in shaping the risk of
violent conflict (Caprioli 2005; Hudson et al. 2009; Melander
2005), we place female political elites at the forefront of the
argument by identifying and recognizing their potential agency
in peace processes. In brief, we argue that legislatures with
larger proportions of female representatives positively influ-
ence the durability of peace through two mechanisms: (1) by
prioritizing social welfare spending overmilitary spending and
(2) by positively influencing public perceptions of governance
quality and elite credibility. In building our argument, we rely
on literature linking good governance to state stability and the
duration of post-conflict peace, as well as studies highlighting
gender-based differences in policy preferences and public per-
ceptions of female elites. We also consider the conditioning
impact of a post-conflict state’s political institutions on the
relationship between female representation and peace dura-
bility. Specifically, legislatures exert greater influence over pol-
icy and are typically perceived to be more credible in states
with nominally democratic formal political institutions. Con-
sequently, we expect that the influence of female representa-
tion on peace durability is strongest in more democratic states
because it is under these conditions that female legislators are
more likely to shape policy and influence public perceptions.
We examine the validity of our argument using cross-
national data on the proportion of women in national legis-
lative bodies and the duration of peace following civil conflicts
terminated via negotiated settlement between 1946 and 2011.
The results of our empirical analysis provide strong support
for our central argument: rising female representation rates
increase the durability of peace following conflicts terminated
via negotiated settlements, especially in states with more dem-
ocratic political institutions. These results are robust to a
variety of alternative specifications. Furthermore, we also find
evidence of the mechanisms that we believe drive this re-
lationship: increased female representation influences publicspending patterns in post-conflict states and improves the
perceived quality of governance and elite credibility, which
in turn reduce the odds of conflict recurrence. Consequently,
our findings support the argument that increasing female
representation may help promote durable peace following ne-
gotiated settlements to civil conflict.
GENDER AND ARMED CONFLICT
Several existing studies have examined the influence of gender
and gender norms on support for, and involvement in, violent
conflict. One body of research asserts that, either as a result
of biology or socialization, women are generally more paci-
fistic than men and inherently resistant to war and militarism
(e.g., Ruddick 1995). Later studies have used this assertion
to argue that peace becomes more likely where women are
better integrated into a state’s political and social institutions
(Demeritt et al. 2015). However, much of the recent literature
examining the relationship between gender and conflict asserts
that, like men, women are capable of either perpetrating vio-
lence or promoting peace (e.g., Sjoberg and Gentry 2007).
While this observation does not rule out the possibility that
gender inclusivity in social and political institutions promotes
peace, it suggests that any theoretical links between gender
and peace should be rooted in claims other than the innate
peacefulness of women.
An alternative strand of research largely eschews any con-
nection between women’s preferences regarding violence and
conflict prevalence and instead highlights the central role that
broader social gender dynamics and norms play in the onset
or perpetuation of political violence. This research suggests
that the existence of patriarchal structures and gender-based
inequality within society exerts a profound impact on a state’s
propensity for political and social violence (Caprioli 2005; Hud-
son et al. 2009; Melander 2005). Yet, while gender norms may
represent a key explanation for social and political violence
propensity, they reflect slow-moving societal transformations
that occur over decades. As such, they are unable to explain
variation in violence over relatively short time horizons. In
addition, these studies often overlook the potential agency
of an important subgroup of actors and appear to disregard
literature highlighting gender-based differences in policy pref-
erences, including attitudes toward the use of violence (Brooks
and Valentino 2011; Conover and Sapiro 1993; McDermott
and Cowden 2002).
A handful of recent studies have acknowledged the po-
tential contributions of women (as a distinct group) to se-
curing peace when they are integrated into policy-making and
political processes. For example, Caprioli, Nielsen, and Hud-
son (2010) find that post-conflict peace is more durable when
women directly participate in the peace process. According
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racies, states with greater numbers of female legislators are
less likely to become involved in international armed conflicts,
and they spend less on national defense. Finally, Demeritt
et al. (2015) find that increasing the inclusion of women in
social and political institutions reduces the risk of civil war
recurrence.
We take these studies as our point of departure. Our ap-
proach focuses on the potential influence of female legislators
on the likelihood of violence, and we apply our argument to
the durability of peace in states emerging from violent inter-
nal conflicts terminated via negotiated settlement. By focusing
on such cases, we can better isolate the influence of changes in
political leadership as distinct from the influence of under-
lying societal factors such as gender norms. Furthermore, we
do not make assumptions about women’s inherent peaceful-
ness and instead focus on differences in the policy priorities
and public perceptions of male and female legislators that have
been empirically documented elsewhere. As we elaborate in
more detail below, these differences—or rather the outcomes
they produce—represent the mechanisms driving the antici-
pated relationship between female representation and conflict
recurrence.
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND FEMALE
REPRESENTATION
While our argument centers on the impact of female repre-
sentation on peace durability, we first discuss the relationship
between the termination of civil conflict and subsequent pat-
terns of female representation. Previous studies demonstrate
that the termination of a civil conflict often contributes to an
increase in the rate of female representation (Hughes 2009;
Hughes and Tripp 2015; Tripp 2015). These studies contend
that the growth in women’s representation following conflict
termination results from both changes in the post-conflict
state’s political institutions and international efforts to increase
women’s presence within domestic political institutions.
While war termination often creates new opportunities for
women to participate in political decision making, these op-
portunities are most likely to occur in the context of negoti-
ated settlement. Negotiated settlements often lead to the de-
velopment and implementation of new governance structures,
electoral systems, and laws (particularly in the case of power-
sharing agreements), which often dramatically expand the pop-
ulation eligible to participate in policy making and politics
(e.g., Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001). More specifi-
cally, external actors involved in peace negotiations, peace-
keeping missions, and the provision of post-conflict aid often
encourage and incentivize states to introduce affirmative ac-
tion mechanisms, such as gender quotas, that positively in-fluence female political representation rates (Anderson and
Swiss 2014; Bush 2011). Organizations such as the UN De-
velopment Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which provide sig-
nificant resources to post-conflict states, have focused in-
creasing attention on gender equality and the promotion of
gender balance (Krook and True 2012; Paxton, Hughes, and
Green 2006).
In addition, the inclusion of domestic civil society in the
peace process—particularlywomen’s organizations influenced
and emboldened by contact with international actors—helps
contribute to increasing women’s political representation fol-
lowing a peace agreement (Hughes and Tripp 2015, 1531).
Ties between domestic civil society groups and transnational
women’s organizations are capable of bringing women into
the peace process and post-conflict political institutions even
when warring parties have largely sidelined women (Ellerby
2013; Paffenholz 2014). Consequently, because negotiations
often involve actors interested in promoting women’s rights
and political access, they are more likely to create opportu-
nities for women’s inclusion in political decision making rel-
ative to conflicts that terminate via other means.
Table 1 illustrates the relationship between the way in
which a conflict terminated and the gender balance in state
legislatures for the years 1946–2011. Data on post-conflict
periods and methods of termination come from the UCDP/
PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (v.4) and UCDP Con-
flict Termination Dataset (v.2) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Kreutz
2010). Data on female representation are from the Women
in Parliament Dataset (Paxton, Green, and Hughes 2008).
The data demonstrate that five years prior to conflict termi-
nation, there is little difference between the rates of female
representation in cases of conflict termination via negotiated
settlement and cases where the conflict terminated via otherTable 1. Female Representation Rates in Post-conflict StatesNegotiated
SettlementNo Negotiated
Settlement Difference5 years prior to
termination 6.84 6.75 2.08Year of
termination 7.92 7.38 2.545 years post-
termination 9.91 7.58 12.32*Note. Difference reflects the difference in representation rates across types
of cases at specified time point.
* p ≤ .05 in difference of means test between termination types at 5 years
post-conflict.
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the legislature increases slightly in both groups at the point
of conflict termination, the difference between negotiated set-
tlement cases and other cases remains minimal. However, the
differences become apparent in the years following the con-
flict. At five years post-conflict, female representation in cases
terminated via negotiated settlement increases 45% compared
to five years prior to termination. By contrast, representation
rates only increase by 12% among states where the conflict
terminated via other means over the same window of time.
Consistent with the literature discussed above, this suggests
that conflict termination via negotiated settlement is often an
intervention that increases female representation in national
legislatures. Moreover, these data suggest that the mode of
conflict termination influences post-conflict female repre-
sentation rates rather than female representation shaping the
likelihood of settlement. This observation is important be-
cause it reduces concerns about potential selection issues that
might bias any observed empirical relationship between fe-
male representation rates and peace durability.
FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND DURABLE PEACE
We now turn to our central argument, which focuses on the
potentially positive influence of increasing female represen-
tation on the ability of states to break free from the “conflict
trap” and secure durable post-conflict peace. States emerging
from civil wars are disproportionately likely to relapse into
conflict, perpetuating a cycle of poverty, poor governance,
and conflict (Collier et al. 2003). The efficient and effective
allocation of state resources to rebuilding infrastructure de-
stroyed during the conflict and meeting the welfare needs of
the population represent a key to promoting stability and re-
ducing the risk of conflict recurrence. Relatedly, convincing
the population that the new government possesses both the
capability and interest to adequately address these issues also
shapes the odds of post-conflict peace. Specifically, when per-
ceptions of elite credibility are low and the public maintains
a poor opinion of the quality of governance provided by the
new government, the risk of return to conflict increases. Gov-
ernments that can address the needs of the population and
promote perceptions of good governance among their citizens
are less likely to face renewed challenges to their authority.
Particularly following a negotiated settlement, preserving the
fragile peace necessitates sustained negotiation and compro-
mise among previous warring parties. By contrast, conflicts
ending in decisive victory for one side are less likely to recur
because one side has been effectively vanquished, limiting its4. We compare termination via ceasefire or peace agreement to ter-
mination via decisive victory or “low-intensity.”ability to mount a renewed challenge to its adversaries and
signaling the likely fate of other challengers. It is for these
reasons that previous studies find that wars terminating in
stalemates or negotiated settlements are more likely to recur
compared to those ending in decisive victories (e.g., Toft 2009;
Walter 2014, 21).
While often overlooked in previous studies of conflict
recurrence, civilian attitudes exert a significant influence on
strategies that former militant leaders adopt (Mukherjee 2006).
Specifically, the level of support insurgent leaders expect to
receive from their civilian constituents (including demobi-
lized former troops) is central to their willingness and ability
to renege on a settlement and revive the conflict. Indeed, gov-
ernments explicitly attempt to shape the attitudes of rebels’
civilian constituents in order to minimize rebel leaders’ ability
to draw on this population for support if there is a resump-
tion of violence (484, 489). The provision of public goods and
signals of effective governance represent two ways in which
the government can increase public loyalty and potentially
weaken loyalty to former insurgent leaders, subsequently re-
ducing the risk of war recurrence.
Moreover, factors that positively influence these percep-
tions should increase the prospects for securing durable peace.
In this section, we argue that legislatures with larger pro-
portions of female representatives influence the durability of
peace by shaping state spending priorities and alter the odds
of conflict recurrence by positively influencing public percep-
tions of governance quality and elite credibility. To be clear,
we are not arguing that increasing female representation re-
presents the only—or even the most common—means of pri-
oritizing social welfare spending and improving perceptions
of governance quality. However, several existing studies sug-
gest that increasing the rate of female representation may
positively influence these factors, thus influencing the dura-
bility of post-conflict peace.
Spending priorities
The ability to devote scarce state resources to public (rather
than private) goods and the implementation of effective dev-
elopment policies is often an essential component of creat-
ing durable peace (Collier et al. 2003; Murshed 2002). Yet,
rather than devoting state resources to implementing policies
that address popular grievances, state leaders often maintain
high levels of spending on the security sector because the
perceived risk of conflict relapse causes pressures to maintain
military readiness (Collier and Hoeffler 2006, 90; Ghobarah,
Huth, and Russet 2004; Iqbal 2010, 124–25). Patterns of re-
source scarcity and underdevelopment that drove the previ-
ous conflict may therefore remain unaddressed (or worsen)
as the new government diverts financial resources away from
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influence peace and stability. States that maintain high levels
of military spending at the expense of social spending are
therefore more likely to experience conflict recurrence (Col-
lier et al. 2003, 71–72, 184). Similarly, Azam (2001) asserts
that a state’s failure to credibly devote substantial resources
to redistribution and social welfare increases the odds that
it experiences social and political violence. Recent empirical
studies investigating this relationship also find that states that
devote greater resources to the provision of social welfare re-
duce the risk of violent internal conflict by improving living
standards, enhancing social stability, and reducing incentives
for violent mobilization against the state (Taydas and Peksen
2012; Thyne 2006). In short, it appears that a state’s spending
priorities influence its risk of experiencing civil conflict.
Changes in post-conflict spending priorities represent one
of the central mechanisms through which we believe that
rising female representation rates reduce the risk of conflict
recurrence. Specifically, increasing female legislative repre-
sentation—in the body typically charged with the allocation
of state resources—is likely to influence spending priorities,
thereby indirectly influencing the likelihood of conflict re-
currence. Existing studies demonstrate that female legislators
pursue different policies than their male counterparts and can
successfully shape policy outputs that reflect these interests
as their proportion of seats grows.5 For instance, states with
larger proportions of female legislators tend to provide greater
amounts of foreign aid to states experiencing humanitarian
disasters (Hicks, Hicks, and Maldonado 2015). Furthermore,
legislative bodies with greater numbers of women are both
more likely to produce legislation that addresses development,
social welfare, and social justice issues (Carroll 2001; Kittilson
2008; Lu and Breuning 2014) and to increase social welfare
expenditures (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007). Similarly, de-
veloping states with larger proportions of female legislators
are more likely to demonstrate improvements in key indica-
tors of social welfare (Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012). They
are also more likely to focus their attention on priorities most
directly affecting women’s lives: women are disproportion-
ately their families’ primary caregivers, disproportionately
employed in social welfare sectors such as healthcare and
education, and typically less directly benefited by military
spending.
As such, women legislators are more likely to spend on
social welfare due to holding feminist preferences (Carroll5. Notably, previous studies suggest that even small increases in women’s
descriptive representationmay exert a substantive impact on policy outcomes
(e.g., Crowley 2004; Erickson 1997).2001) and/or having shared life experience that leads them
to acutely value such spending (Mansbridge 1999). For ex-
ample, in 1999, South African female legislators protested ex-
panding military expenditures at the expense of spending on
economic development and healthcare (Anderlini 2007, 142).
Three years later, Parliamentarian Pregs Govender resigned
in protest over the government’s continued increases in mili-
tary spending, stating, emphatically, “24,000 people die every
day from poverty, and women and children continue to bear
the brunt of this. . . . War makes the profit margins that peace
does not. We have to loudly say No! No! No! We will not
accept that human life is so easily devalued and dispensable”
(Govender 2002). Govender’s efforts to resist increased mil-
itary spending at the expense of allocations for social wel-
fare programs may illustrate a more general empirical trend.
While few existing studies have directly assessed the rela-
tionship between female representation rates and the trade-
off between military and social spending, Koch and Fulton
(2011) find that among democratic states, military spend-
ing declines as the proportion of female legislators in-
creases.
Both the anecdotal evidence and recent empirical analyses
discussed above suggest that female policy makers are often
acutely aware of the implications of the trade-off between
“guns and butter” and are more likely than their male coun-
terparts to prioritize the latter. Thus, higher rates of female
representation in national legislatures should contribute to
greater social welfare expenditures. This does not necessarily
imply that female political elites are inherently more pacifis-
tic; rather, it suggests that female leaders may view human
security through a different lens than their male counterparts.
To the extent that increasing female representation shapes
spending priorities, it should therefore also have an impact
on the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence.
Perceptions of governance quality and elite
credibility
Perceptions of governance quality, the credibility of elites
and policy makers, and overall trust in the new government
represent the second set of mechanisms through which we
argue that female legislative representation influences the du-
rability of peace. Walter (2014), for example, demonstrates
that the presence of institutions that signal accountability and
elite commitment to the terms of a negotiated settlement exert
a powerful suppressive influence on conflict recurrence. Con-
sistent with this perspective, several recent studies find that
variables accounting for the quality and perceptions of quality
of governance—including government effectiveness, social
spending, and corruption controls—reduce the risk of conflict
recurrence (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Fearon 2011; Hegre
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highlight the importance of elite credibility and inter-elite
trust in preserving post-conflict peace. Indeed, power-sharing
mechanisms and institutions that promote good governance
are expected to help promote peace where trust is low and
doubts regarding actors’ credibility remain high (Hartzell and
Hoddie 2007; Hartzell et al. 2001; Mattes and Savun 2009).
Greater inclusivity may promote cooperation and perceptions
of credibility by signaling a break from the political status quo.
As we noted above, conflict termination creates new op-
portunities for women to participate in political decision mak-
ing and tends to increase female representation rates. Given
that states that are most likely to experience internal conflicts
also tend to exclude women from positions of political au-
thority (Melander 2005), increases in the rate of female rep-
resentation following conflict suggest the introduction of “new
faces” into positions of power. Political newcomers are more
likely to represent a break with the past and less likely to be
viewed as responsible for past political failures and the traumas
inflicted on the population during the war. In other words, the
replacement of the “old guard” with new political actors sig-
nals new opportunities for cooperation and may positively in-
fluence public perceptions of the quality of governance in the
post-conflict state.
The effect of elite turnover on public perceptions of trust
and credibility may be most direct when the new elites are
women. Previous research demonstrates that both women
and men perceive women as more peaceful than men (Rud-
man and Goodwin 2004). Whether or not women are actu-
ally more committed to peace is largely irrelevant in this con-
text; what matters is that audiences perceive that female elites
are more likely to choose policies conducive to peace over
those conducive to war. Koch and Fulton (2011, 4) similarly
note that cross-national research on gender stereotypes finds
that audiences perceive that women are generally more co-
operative and compassionate. Moreover, audiences generally
perceive female candidates and policy makers to be compar-
atively less corrupt than men (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014;
Treisman 2007), more dedicated to earnest and honest gov-
ernance (McDermott 1998), and more committed to com-
promise (Pew Research Center 2015, 6). Previous studies also
demonstrate a positive correlation between women’s legisla-
tive representation and trust in Congress in the United States
and Latin America (Lawless 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). An-
ecdotal evidence further suggests that citizens in post-conflict
states often view female politicians as less corrupt and more
dedicated to providing public goods (McGrew, Frieson, and
Chan 2004). In sum, the perception—if not the reality—that
women are more trustworthy than their male counterparts is
well established in the existing literature.The literature reviewed above suggests that increasing
the number of female decision makers should positively in-
fluence public perceptions that newly included elites are less
encumbered by previous political disputes, more credible,
and more likely to govern effectively. Ultimately, as the per-
ceived credibility of the government and the perception of
leaders’ commitment to good governance increases, popular
support for a return to violent rebellion against the state
should decline. In other words, these factors should diminish
the potential support militant leaders expect from their ci-
vilian supporters, thus reducing their incentives to draw the
country back into conflict.Summary and hypotheses
Previous studies highlight the fragility of peace following
negotiated settlement in contrast to conflicts terminating via
other means. In part, the high risk of conflict recurrence
endures because the regime often prioritizes security inter-
ests over social welfare interests, thus failing to address the
factors that motivated or enabled the conflict in the first
place. Breaking this conflict trap therefore requires altering
spending priorities. Relatedly, perceptions of the quality of
governance and belief in elites’ commitment to peace in-
fluence the risk of conflict recurrence. Where trust remains
low and audiences perceive that the government is inef-
fective, unaccountable, and corrupt, incentives for violence
will linger among the population, particularly among former
combatants. We argue, however, that increasing female rep-
resentation in national legislative bodies can improve the
prospects of such outcomes and contribute to the preven-
tion of conflict recurrence. Particularly, we assert that female
legislative representation influences peace durability follow-
ing negotiated settlements by altering spending priorities and
improving public perceptions of the quality of governance.
This produces our central hypothesis:
H1. Following a negotiated settlement, states with a
greater proportion of female representatives in the na-
tional legislature are less likely to experience conflict
relapse.
The above discussion suggests a general relationship be-
tween female representation in legislatures and peace dura-
bility. However, the argument rests in part on the assump-
tion that these legislators have the ability to influence policies
or that they are at least perceived to possess such influence.
While previous research suggests that legislative bodies in
authoritarian and other undemocratic systems can restrain
state leaders and successfully shape policy outputs (e.g.,
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cally greater in democratic states. Consequently, the mecha-
nisms we propose should exert a stronger influence in states
with more democratic institutions compared to more auto-
cratic states. In other words, the influence of female legisla-
tors to affect policy is likely most constrained under condi-
tions of weak legislative authority, while female legislators are
most efficacious in more democratic systems. Similarly, we
expect the public to perceive democratic legislatures as com-
parativelymore effective and to view their members’ promises
to deliver desired policies as more credible. Thus, we antici-
pate that the relationship between female representation and
peace durability is conditioned by a state’s prevailing political
institutions. This produces our second hypothesis:
H2. The influence of female representation on the
risk of conflict recurrence following civil conflict in-
creases in the context of more democratic political
institutions.RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Our argument posits that states with higher female represen-
tation rates in the national legislature are less likely to expe-
rience civil conflict recurrence following a negotiated settle-
ment compared to states whose legislative bodies remainmore
male-dominated. Our argument linking female representa-
tion and peace durability following a negotiated settlement
focused on two specific mechanisms: national legislatures im-
plementing policies that effectively address the grievances that
likely prompted and sustained the initial conflict and public
perceptions of good governance and elite credibility.While our
primary intention is to demonstrate the relationship between
female representation rates and the durability of peace, we first
endeavor to demonstrate the validity of our proposed mech-
anisms.We then turn to our primary analysis, which examines
the influence of female representation rates—as well as state
spending priorities and perceptions of governance quality—
on the durability of peace following negotiated settlement.6. Every country in our post–World War II sample possesses some
form of national legislative body at some point during the sample window.
During years in which no legislature existed or where it was (temporarily)
suspended, we code these cases as missing. However, we recode Female
Representation as 0 for these observations and include a dummy variable
reflecting the presence or absence of a legislature during the year in the
analysis. The results are similar (see the appendix).Female representation, spending,
and governance quality
Webegin with an examination of the relationship between the
rate of female representation in post-conflict legislatures and
measures of government spending priorities and perceptions
of the quality of governance. To do so, we first identify a
sample of post-conflict cases.We base our sample on the cases
of intrastate and internationalized internal armed conflicts
included in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD)
(v.4) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). For inclusion in this data set, aconflict must center on a stated incompatibility (territorial
or governmental) between the host state government and an
armed adversary that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths
per year. Because lower-intensity conflicts frequently termi-
nate and re-emerge, making it difficult to determine precise
end dates, we adopt the commonly employed practice of
merging conflict episodes separated by fewer than two years
into the same episode. A conflict is coded as terminated when
it produces fewer than 25 battle-related deaths each year for
two consecutive years. Similarly, conflict recurrence is coded
when violence exceeds 25 deaths in a year after at least a two-
year lull in the fighting. Because our argument about the in-
fluence of female representation is most theoretically perti-
nent in post-conflict periods following negotiated settlement,
we limit our analysis to these cases. Specifically, our sample
includes only conflicts coded as terminating via formal peace
agreements or ceasefires according to the UCDP Conflict
Termination Dataset (v.2) (Kreutz 2010). Peace periods there-
fore reflect all years between the termination of a given con-
flict via a negotiated settlement and its recurrence. After ac-
counting for differences in the temporal window for some of
the covariates included in the analysis, our sample represents
58 distinct conflicts occurring in 48 countries between 1946
and 2011.
Our primary explanatory variable is the rate of Female
Representation. We follow existing studies and include only
the proportion of women sitting in the lower (or only) chamber
of a state’s national legislature during the year. This is a com-
mon practice since most upper chambers lack significant
political authority due to partisan congruence with the lower
chamber and/or because the lower chamber is vested with
much greater power over budgets and policymaking (Lijphart
1987). Consequently, this coding captures the proportion of
women in the body that is most likely to influence the mech-
anisms highlighted above. Data for this variable come pri-
marily from the Women in Parliament Dataset (Paxton et al.
2008), but this is supplemented with information from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) Data-
base (World Bank 2015).6
We rely on multiple measures to capture state spending
priorities and perceptions of governance quality. First, we
construct the variable Spending Ratio, which reflects the
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the indicator, we divide total annual health expenditures by
military expenditures to create a ratio in which larger values
reflect greater spending on health relative to the military. We
log-transform this ratio measure because of its significant
positive skew. These data are taken from the United Nations’
data website (United Nations 2016b) and the WDI, respec-
tively. We rely on three variables from the World WGI da-
tabase as proxies for perceptions of government credibility
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011).7 Accountability
captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able
to participate in the selection of their government and to
engage in free political expression. Effectiveness reflects per-
ceptions of the quality of public services, the perceived free-
dom of the civil service from political control, and the gov-
ernment’s commitment to high quality policy formulation
and implementation. Finally, Corruption Control reflects
perceptions of the extent to which political elites exercise
public power for private gains, as well as perceptions of the
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. While
none of these variables completely captures attitudes toward
political elites, trust in government, or a belief in elites’ com-
mitment to peace, they should serve as adequate proxies for
these concepts. Importantly, they should represent a reason-
able test of our arguments because they explicitly capture
perceptions of the quality of governance in a state rather than
institutions or laws. The creators generate each indicator by
combining multiple individual data sources (e.g., citizen, ex-
pert, and enterprise surveys) through a statistical tool known
as an Unobserved Components Model.8 Each resulting indi-
cator is a standardized, normally distributed continuous mea-
sure ranging from 22.5 to 2.5.
We include several relevant controls in all of our models
of spending and governance quality. We first control for the
state’s formal political institutions with an indicator repre-
senting institutional Democracy. We rely on the 21-point
Polity2 measure of the Polity IV data set (Marshall, Jaggers,
and Gurr 2011). To test our second hypothesis, we inter-
act Democracy with Female Representation. We control for
Wealth by including estimated GDP per capita as well as the
size of the state’s Population (Gleditsch 2002, updated through
2011). We also control for the duration of the previous con-
flict with the variable Conflict Duration and the time since
the last conflict with the variable Years Since Conflict. We7. The WGI measures are available only every other year between
1996 and 2001 and every year thereafter. For our analyses, we linearly
interpolate the missing years.
8. For detailed information on the methodology, see Kaufmann et al.
(2011).include the variables Natural Resource Revenue and Foreign
Aid, both as percentages of GDP (gross domestic product),
because they often serve as sources of elite rent-seeking,
which can erode governance quality. These data come from
the WDI (World Bank 2015).
Several previous studies also highlight the important role
that Power Sharing institutions play in preventing conflict
recurrence following negotiated settlement. In part, such
agreements may promote beneficial spending policies, en-
courage trust among elites, and improve citizens’ percep-
tions of governance quality. We therefore include a binary
indicator accounting for the presence of such institutions
(Cammett and Malesky 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).
Finally, we control for the presence of an Active Conflict in
the county. States may be subject to multiple civil conflicts,
and the emergence of a new conflict may lead to an increase
in military spending and de-prioritization of social welfare
spending. It may also erode public perceptions of good gov-
ernance. This variable is coded 1 if the UCDP/PRIO ACD
data set indicates that a state was host to any additional con-
flicts (not associated with the previously terminated conflict)
during a given year.
We report the results of our spending and governance
models in table 2. In all models, we lag Female Represen-
tation to account for the time lag between legislative deci-
sion making and policy outcomes.9 In the interest of space,
we only discuss these results in brief. We note that the
Female Representation rate exerts a positive and statistically
significant influence on both the spending variable and on
the proxies for public perceptions of governance quality, ex-
cept in the case of Effectiveness, where the coefficient is pos-
itive but fails to achieve statistical significance. The Female
Representation # Democracy interaction term also exerts a
positive and statistically significant influence on these out-
comes, except in the case of Accountability, where the coef-
ficient is positive but fails to achieve statistical significance.
Overall, these results suggest that legislatures with larger pro-
portions of female members spend comparatively more on
social welfare expenditures relative to military expenditures
when compared to legislatures with fewer women, particu-
larly in countries with democratic political institutions. We
observe a similar relationship between female representation
and our measures of the perception of good governance.
These results do not necessarily imply that governments with
greater proportions of women are in fact more effective
and accountable or less corrupt. Rather, the results suggest9. The spending data and WGI measures are available from 1995 and
1996, respectively, thus limiting the time frame of our analysis and sub-
stantially reducing the number of observations.
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ness leaders, and the general public—perceive such legisla-
tures as superior in these areas.Female representation and peace durability
Having established the relationship between female repre-
sentation, spending, and governance outcomes, we turn to
an empirical test of our primary argument. According to our
hypotheses, we expect that increasing Female Representa-
tion rates will increase peace durability following conflicts
terminated via negotiated settlement.10 We empirically ex-
amine the impact of this variable—as well as the impact of10. Substituting the average female representation rate of the first five
post-conflict years, which helps account for the growth of female repre-
sentation overtime, yields similar results (see the appendix).the outcome variables examined in table 2—on the dura-
bility of peace.We lag the Female Representation variable for
one period in all models to account for the likely time lag
between changes in the composition of government and
changes in public attitudes or government spending deci-
sions that may shape the odds of conflict.
In our analyses, we rely on the same sample defined above
and utilize many of the same control variables, including
Democracy, Population, Conflict Duration, Active Conflict,
and Power Sharing. However, we include several additional
predictors demonstrated by previous studies to influence
peace durability following civil conflict. We control for Ter-
ritorial Conflict using the indicator included in the UCDP
data sets. We include the variable Resource Distribution,
which is a binary indicator accounting forwhether the conflict
focused on a disagreement over the distribution of natural
resources or natural resource-derived revenues (Rustad andTable 2. Determinants of Spending and Good GovernanceSpending Accountability Effectiveness Corruption ControlModel 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Female representation(t-1) .009* 2.004 .004* .002 .003 2.002 .006* 2.000
(.004) (.006) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)Democracy .030* .009 .057* .053* .010* .001 .010* 2.002
(.008) (.011) (.005) (.007) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.005)Wealth (natural log) 2.205* 2.229* .129* .126* .275* .270* .144* .137*
(.056) (.055) (.030) (.030) (.027) (.026) (.024) (.025)Population (natural log) .135* .168* 2.098* 2.096* 2.210* 2.204* 2.166* 2.156*
(.063) (.062) (.034) (.034) (.030) (.030) (.029) (.029)Conflict duration (natural log) .002 2.003 .001 .001 2.008 2.009 .002 .001
(.026) (.026) (.010) (.010) (.013) (.012) (.012) (.012)Time since conflict (natural log) .026 .033 .030* .032* .015* .017* .006 .009
(.022) (.022) (.012) (.012) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.010)Power sharing .244 .259* 2.045 2.044 2.010 2.005 2.153* 2.143*
(.092) (.092) (.050) (.050) (.047) (.047) (.050) (.050)Foreign aid (%GDP) .002 .002 2.000 2.000 2.001 2.001 2.000 2.000
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)Resource rents (%GDP) 2.002 2.001 2.004* 2.004* 2.006* 2.006* 2.005* 2.005*
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)Active conflict 2.140 2.131 2.048 2.042 2.050 2.042 2.101* 2.090*
(.087) (.083) (.041) (.041) (.037) (.036) (.047) (.043)Female representation # democracy .003* .000 .001* .001*
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)Wald X2 66.87 93.20 294.68 339.32 271.57 295.88 96.23 109.22
R2 .22 .25 .54 .54 .51 .52 .39 .41
N 427 427 463 463 463 463 463 463Note. The table presents coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from Prais-Winsten regression models with AR1 corrections.
* p ≤ .05 (one-tailed test).
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keepers to account for the presence of a United Nations
peacekeeping force (United Nations 2016a). Other studies
noting a relationship between female representation and vio-
lence suggest that the rate of female representationmay simply
reflect norms of greater societal gender equality within the
state, which may in turn influence a state’s risk of involvement
in conflict (Melander 2005). We therefore account for gender
equality by including Secondary Education Ratio, which serves
as a proxy for societal gender equality (World Bank 2015).11
Our argument focuses on the impact of female represen-
tation on the duration of time until war resumes (peace
failure). To assess this relationship, we rely on conventional
Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH) models using time (in days)
until the resumption of conflict or until an observation is
censored (exits the data set) as the outcome. While a num-
ber of parametric and nonparametric estimation options are
available, we select a CPH model because it is more flexible
than parametric approaches and does not require us to make
assumptions about the baseline hazard. We report the results
from the CPH models in table 3.12 Rather than report hazard
rates, we report coefficients for each variable. Positive values
suggest that a given predictor increases the risk of conflict
recurrence, while negative values reduce this risk.
Model 9 represents a baseline model evaluating the over-
all influence of Female Representation on conflict recurrence.
The results from this model suggest that the proportion of
female legislators has a negative and statistically significant
influence on the risk of peace failure. In other words, increas-
ing female representation increases the expected duration of
peace following negotiated settlements. Model 10 introduces
the control for Secondary Education Ratio. Despite accounting
for this variable, the relationship between Female Represen-
tation and peace durability still obtains, providing support for
our first hypothesis. This result improves our confidence that
we are not simply observing a spurious relationship driven by
societal gender norms: states whose legislatures include larger
numbers of female members are more likely to enjoy longer
periods of post-conflict peace than those with fewer female
members.
Model 11 introduces the Female Representation# Democ-
racy interaction term. The results indicate that the relation-11. As robustness checks, we also control for other factors that may
influence the number of women in a legislature and potentially the risk of
conflict recurrence. Controls for legislative dominance by a left-oriented
party and the presence of gender quotas do not change the results (see the
appendix).
12. Standard diagnostics reveal no significant violations of the pro-
portional hazard assumption.ship between female representation and peace durability is
conditioned by the presence of more democratic political
institutions. In order to examine the effects of this interac-
tion on peace durability, we present the linear predictions in
figure 1. The figure indicates that the suppressive effect of
women’s representation on the risk of conflict recurrence
increases as a state’s political institutions become more dem-
ocratic. Moreover, the effect only appears to be significant
(fully below the zero line) once a state’s political institutions
become at least modestly democratic (e.g., Polity2 p 3).
These results provide strong support for our hypotheses:
the durability of post-conflict peace following a negotiated
settlement increases as female representation increases, par-
ticularly in democratic states. However, we also argue that this
relationship is driven primarily by the impact that increas-
ing female representation exerts on perceptions of governance
and on spending priorities. This proposition presupposes that
these factors exert an independent influence on the longevity
of post-conflict peace. While previous studies have demon-
strated these relationships, we examine the influence of our
proxy measures for these factors on the duration of post-
conflict peace inmodels 12–15.Model 12 includes the variable
Spending Ratio, which is both negative and statistically sig-
nificant. This suggests that states devoting larger proportions
of annual expenditures to social welfare relative to themilitary
enjoy longer periods of post-conflict peace. Our proxies for
perceived good governance are negatively associated with con-
flict recurrence.While Effectiveness and Corruption Control
achieve statistical significance, Accountability fails to do so.
Overall, and consistent with previous studies (Fearon 2011;
Hegre and Nygärd 2015; Walter 2014, 1258), these results
imply that as perceptions of good governance increase, the
risk of conflict recurrence declines.13 Moreover, consistent
with our argument, the inclusion of these indicators gener-
ally weakens the relationship between Female Representation
and conflict recurrence. Specifically, we asserted that the im-
pact of female representation on peace durability largely works
by influencing spending priorities and shaping public per-
ceptions of good governance and elite credibility in post-
conflict states, and these results support that assertion.
We plot the survival curves from model 11 in figure 2.
The figure shows the estimated proportion of cases with the
specified characteristics that survive (remain at peace) until
a given time point.We illustrate the effect of legislative gender13. The lack of a significant relationship between the accountability
measure and conflict risk is consistent with Fearon (2011). These studies
also find that institutional measures of good governance reduce conflict
risk; robustness checks using these measures yield similar results to our
primary findings (see the appendix).
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Female Representation in the sample (10.5%) as well as one
standard deviation above (18.5%) and below (2.5%) the mean
in both democracies (left panel) and nondemocracies (right
panel).14 The figure highlights the strong positive influence of
female representation on peace durability following a nego-
tiated settlement among states with more democratic political
institutions. While there is little variation in the influence of14. Survival curves are based on Polity2 scores of 6 for democracy and
0 for nondemocracy.this variable in the hypothetical nondemocratic state illus-
trated in the right panel, it is clear that higher rates of Female
Representation substantially improve the survival rate among
modestly democratic states. For instance, at 10 years post-
conflict, approximately 85% of democratic states with a Fe-
male Representation rate one standard deviation above the
sample mean survive without experiencing conflict relapse,
while only 68% of autocratic states with the same Female
Representation rate survive to that point. At themean value of
Female Representation, roughly 72% of democratic cases and
only 60% of autocratic cases survive until the 10 year mark.
And at low levels of female representation, only around 45%Table 3. Determinants of Post-conflict Peace DurabilityModel 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15Female representation(t-1) 2.060* 2.065* 2.016 2.062 2.062 2.053 2.057
(.028) (.027) (.032) (.049) (.041) (.042) (.040)Democracy 2.000 2.025 .075 .042 2.002 2.040 2.046
(.040) (.052) (.073) (.100) (.102) (.059) (.060)Distribution .501 .523 .451 .776* .694* .657* .557
(.440) (.492) (.481) (.471) (.398) (.400) (.382)Territorial 2.693 2.667 2.723 21.439 21.558 21.588* 21.660*
Conflict (.600) (.687) (.707) (1.173) (.970) (.954) (.917)
Population (natural log) .057 .067 .093 .285* .246 .328* .261*(.132) (.126) (.126) (.161) (.161) (.163) (.148)
UN peacekeepers 2.131 .241 .318 .182 2.915 2.892 2.690(.480) (.447) (.461) (.599) (.918) (.739) (.732)
Power sharing 2.308 2.189 2.325 .117 .341 .278 .185(.467) (.491) (.495) (.588) (.694) (.624) (.590)
Conflict duration (natural log) 2.280* 2.315* 2.359* 2.336 2.434* 2.510* 2.476*(.115) (.130) (.132) (.212) (.217) (.238) (.218)
Active conflict .878 1.141* .893 2.284 1.459* 1.453* 1.262*(.585) (.628) (.578) (1.045) (.761) (.729) (.746)
Secondary .003 .004 2.025 2.013 2.002 2.009
Education ratio (.012) (.012) (.017) (.016) (.016) (.016)






Wald X 2 16.14 19.28 26.10 31.43 42.42 41.80 45.16
N 737 675 675 442 483 483 483Note. The table presents coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from Cox Proportional Hazard models. Standard errors are clustered on country
in all models.
* p ≤ .05 (one-tailed test).
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difference between the effects of female representation in the
context of democratic versus nondemocratic states is consis-
tent with our expectations. The greater independence and
authority of legislatures in more democratic states allow the
representatives in those institutions to exert comparativelygreater influence over policy outcomes compared to their
counterparts in more autocratic states. Consequently, we note
that very low rates of female representation in more demo-
cratic states appear to jeopardize peace, while greater fe-
male representation tends to make post-conflict peace more
durable.
With respect to the control variables, we note in multiple
specifications that Conflict Duration is negative and signif-
icant. This suggests that longer—and presumably more
costly—conflicts are less likely to recur, as are those in coun-
tries emerging from territorial conflict. In contrast, another
active conflict negatively affects peace durability, while the
presence of UN peacekeepers often exerts a negative but in-
consistent effect. Somewhat surprisingly, democracy appears
unrelated to peace duration except when interacted with fe-
male representation. Given the results for the Effectiveness
measure, this suggests that perceptions of democratic gover-
nance may be more important for preserving post-conflict
peace than the institutions themselves.
Finally, it is plausible that the variable Female Represen-
tation is systematically correlated with unobservable factors
related to the time since the previous conflict, thus biasing our
results. To account for this possibility, we re-analyze ourmodel
using an instrumental variables approach. Specifically, we em-
ploy an IV probit model with controls for temporal depen-Figure 1. Conditional influence of female representation on conflict recur-
rence. Figure 1 shows the impact of a unit change in Female Representation
on the risk of conflict recurrence over the range of the Democracy indicator
based on linear predictions derived from model 11.Figure 2. Survival curves from Cox Proportional Hazard models. The figure demonstrates the estimated survival rates for hypothetical states in which the
conflict terminated in a peace agreement with Female Representative set at the sample mean, and one standard deviation above and below the sample mean
for a democratic state (left panel) and nondemocratic state (right panel). Estimates are derived from model 11.
Volume 79 Number 3 July 2017 / 1007dence, including both the one-year lag of the regional average
of female representation and presence of nationally legislated
gender quotas as our exogenous instruments. The results, dis-
cussed in the appendix (available online), are robust to this
approach.CONCLUSION
The arguments presented above posited that negotiated
settlements are more durable in states with more gender-
inclusive political leadership. We argue that this occurs be-
cause, compared to other forms of conflict termination, nego-
tiated settlements create more new opportunities for women’s
incorporation into positions of political leadership and the
increase in female representation provides distinct prospects
for breaking the conflict trap. Most important, we argue that
increases in the rate of female representation reduce the risk
of conflict occurrence by implementing policies that continue
to address the conditions that drove the initial conflict and by
improving perceptions of trust and credibility among political
elites. We find strong empirical support for both our general
argument regarding the relationship between female repre-
sentation rates and peace durability, as well as the mecha-
nisms that we believe drive this relationship: the influence of
women’s representation on spending priorities and percep-
tions of good governance. We also find that these relation-
ships are particularly strong in democratic states, which we
have argued results from the greater authority and influence
exercised by legislatures in states with more democratic po-
litical institutions.
There is no guarantee that including more women will
necessarily lead to these outcomes.Women’s abilities to signal
trust and credibility, their specific policy preferences, and their
ability to implement these policies likely vary according to
political and social contexts. Moreover, our argument focuses
on the average attitudes and attributes of women that have
been highlighted in previous literature, and our results reflect
the average effect of the inclusion of such women in legis-
latures. Thus, an interesting question with respect to greater
inclusivity as a mechanism for altering spending priorities
and public perceptions is whether all women or all minority
groups necessarily exert the same effect on peace durability.
Distinct effects may result if different groups of womenwithin
a legislature hold competing preferences or if women’s pres-
ence in decision-making roles is perceived as contrary to
traditional gender stereotypes and roles, potentially produc-
ing a backlash against their inclusion and the policies they
pursue. Additionally, although we have focused our attention
on how the inclusion of women can lead to greater credibility
among post-conflict bargaining partners, a complementarylogic may extend to the inclusion of other “out-groups.” That
is, similar to the logic we put forth, incorporating other pre-
viously marginalized groups may improve perceptions of gov-
ernance quality and result in the creation of policies that re-
duce the risk of war recurrence. Alternatively, however, the
inclusion of these groups may provoke a contrary reaction
that undermines peace. Such issues should be addressed more
directly in future studies.
Finally, our study points to two important policy appli-
cations. First, we highlight the potential agency of women
within the post-conflict political process. In contrast to studies
that focus on gender norms or hierarchies as a causal expla-
nation for peace, our argument and analysis place the roles
of women at the forefront of policy making. While underly-
ing gender norms likely exert a strong influence on the over-
all propensity for violence within a society, norms are noto-
riously sticky and evolve slowly over time. Thus, norms alone
are unlikely to strongly influence the propensity for a state
emerging from civil conflict to relapse into violence. However,
conflict termination—particularly via negotiated settlement—
presents a wealth of new opportunities for women to become
involved in political and policy-making processes. Thus,
women’s formal political representation in these cases rapidly
outpaces changes in societal norms. Our results suggest that
this increase in female representation—rather than just un-
derlying norms—influences the likelihood of conflict recur-
rence. Accordingly, our results highlight the important role
that the inclusion of women in political processes plays in
helping to resolve the conflict trap and secure more durable
peace. From a policy standpoint, our results support advocacy
for affirmative action policies that encourage or include more
women in political decision-making bodies in post-conflict
states.
Second, in line with previous studies (Taydas and Peksen
2012; Thyne 2006), we demonstrate the importance of social
spending to prevent conflict recurrence. However, we also
note that many post-conflict states appear unable or unwilling
to engage in such spending despite the demonstrated benefits
to achieving long-term peace. Furthermore, such spending
need not occur exclusively when women are elected to office:
certainly men can prioritize social welfare spending, too. Con-
sequently, from a policy standpoint, our results broadly sup-
port government interventions that invest in and improve
social welfare programs in post-conflict states.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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